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Trends in income inequality: comparing the United States and Portugal 
 
Abstract 
This article presents a comparative analysis of the United States and Portugal in terms 
of economic inequality over a long period of time, from the early 20th century to the 
present decade. We use different measures of inequality from several statistical 
sources. The article revolves around three complementary points. The first is a 
synchronic and diachronic analysis of economic inequalities Portugal and the United 
States, the second is the issue of redistribution of income and the final analysis 
addresses the evolution of top incomes in both countries.  
 
Keywords: economic inequality, top incomes, redistribution, Portugal, United States 
 
Introduction 
The article addresses economic inequality in Portugal and the United States and 
revolves around three different points. We first conduct a synchronic and diachronic 
analysis of economic inequality in the two countries using the OECD countries as a 
reference. What is the position of these two countries regarding economic inequality 
in the OECD universe? How did income inequality evolved in the last three decades in 
Portugal and the United States? Did they went through similar patterns or were there 
important differences between them? Our analysis then focuses on the issue of 
redistribution of income. How big is the impact of redistributive mechanisms in 
Portugal and the United States? Which redistributive mechanisms are more relevant in 
each country? The third point is an analysis of top incomes and their growth in the two 
countries over a long period. Is the intensity of income concentration at the top similar 
in Portugal and the United States? Have these inequality measures been historically 
stable or did they change quite significantly over the last century? To what extend has 
income concentration at the top been one of the main forces behind rising economic 
inequality in Portugal and the United States? 
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Income inequality has been the main focus of several studies regarding Portuguese 
and United States societies. The uneven distribution of wages and income, which rely 
on the most on educational and class inequality, has been stressed as the core 
explanation to the increase of economic inequality in Portugal in the last decades 
(Carmo, Carvalho and Cantante 2015; Cantante 2014; Costa et. al. 2015; Martins et. al.  
2014; Rodrigues, Figueiras e Junqueira 2012).This analytical perspective has been 
complemented by an analysis of redistribution policies, whose impacts are considered 
comparatively low (Alves, 2012; Rodrigues, Figueiras e Junqueira 2012). Regarding the 
United States, most studies have highlighted the role of income and wealth 
concentration at the very top as the main driver of economic inequality (Piketty 2013; 
Stiglitz 2012; Krugman 2007; Piketty e Saez 2007). 
This article will discuss and foster some of these analytical footsteps, developing for 
the first time a direct comparative analysis of these two very different countries, who 
share a common structural feature: high internal economic inequalities. For that, 
several measures of inequality and a variety of sources will be used. 
A comparative analysis of a particular social fact or phenomenon entails examining the 
comparability of empirical universes of reference from a methodological and 
theoretical point of view. The cross-referencing, opposition or synthesis of information 
on two or more empirical study referents means questioning the pertinence and 
admissibility of this exercise on the basis of the profile or characteristics of the 
universes compared. So, how can a study that chooses economic inequality as a 
central subject use as empirical references two countries whose aggregate income 
levels are very different? 
With a gross domestic product (GDP) of 10,830.3 billion euros (14,991.3 billion dollars), 
in 2011 the United States was the country with the highest aggregate income in the 
world. It was higher than the GDP of the entire euro area and substantially higher than 
that of China. Portugal's GDP on the other hand was 171.9 billion euros (270.1 billion 
dollars). To get a clearer idea of the size of the United States' GDP, it represents 
around 63 times that of Portugal (in euros). This aggregate income gap could be 
3 
 
attributed to another substantial difference in scale between the two countries: 
population. While the population of Portugal was around 10.5 million according to the 
2011 census, that of the United States was approximately 308.7 million (2010 census). 
In other words, the United States' population was 29.4 times larger than Portugal's. In 
spite of this huge demographic difference, it is much smaller than that in economic 
share. The disproportion between the aggregate income in the United States and 
Portugal is much greater than the demographic disparity.  
This means that GDP per inhabitant in the United States is much higher than in 
Portugal. In 2011, Portugal's per capita GDP was 19,500 PPS1, i.e. 77% of that in the 27 
European Union countries (EU-27=100%), while in the United States it was 37,100 PPS, 
48% higher than the EU-27.  For an idea of the magnitude of this economic indicator in 
the United States, per capita GDP in Germany was 30,300 PPS, "only" 21% higher than 
the EU average.    
Aggregate economic income indicators, such as GDP or gross national income (GNI) 2 
per capita, can be used as approximate predictors of the standard of living of a 
country's population. If we analyse the Human Development Index (HDI), we find that 
macroeconomic indicators tend to be associated with differences in living standards. It 
is enough to compare the GNI per capita in countries with a very high HDI with those 
that have a medium or low HDI. This is not a linear ratio, however, and there are cases 
in which living standards (e.g. health and education) are higher than a country's 
economic wealth and vice-versa. One of the reasons for this is the internal distribution 
of income. A country may be very rich but if income is concentrated in a minority of 
the population, the standard of living and wellbeing of the majority will tend not to 
                                                          
1
 The purchasing power standard, abbreviated as PPS, is an artificial currency unit. Theoretically, one 
PPS can buy the same amount of goods and services in each country. However, price differences across 
borders mean that different amounts of national currency units are needed for the same goods and 
services depending on the country. PPS are derived by dividing any economic aggregate of a country in 
national currency by its respective purchasing power parities.  PPS is the technical term used by Eurostat 
for the common currency in which national accounts aggregates are expressed when adjusted for price 
level differences using PPPs. Thus, PPPs can be interpreted as the exchange rate of the PPS against the 
euro. (Eurostat) 
2
 Gross domestic product is the result of production within a country, even contributions from non-
residents. Gross national income is “the income received by a country's residents, regardless of where 
the production processes in which they involved occur” (Ramos, 2013: 34).  
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correspond to this level of income. The oil-exporting countries in the Middle East are a 
good example of this type of disparity.  
The use of indicators like GDP or GNI when characterising a country's economic 
wellbeing and associated standards of living is a panoramic approach to their social 
reality. These are significant structural indicators because they provide information 
about “how much is produced and the average income generated or distributed in a 
country, which, if used properly, can generate material wellbeing” (Ramos 2013: 37). 
But a look at the economic pie tells us nothing about how it is sliced up. Refining our 
analysis of the social wellbeing and standard of living of a country's population also 
means focusing on its income distribution structure, especially in terms of disposable 
income. Although there is a huge difference between the aggregate product generated 
in Portugal and the United States, both countries have very high levels of inequality in 
the distribution of income. While it is true that the amount of income produced and 
the way it is allocated per inhabitant is a feature that clearly sets Portugal and the 
United States apart among the OECD countries, domestic economic inequality brings 
them closer together. 
 
Economic inequality as a structural feature of societies 
  
Several studies have underscored the idea that economic inequality tends to have 
negative effects on the functioning of societies and the population's living standards. 
The Spirit Level (2009) by Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett was perhaps one of the 
most important and effective contributions to the dissemination of this argument. 
They demonstrate that in the OECD countries the societies with higher levels of 
economic inequality are also those with the worst performance in such a variety of 
areas as confidence level, life expectancy, infant mortality, obesity, children's 
educational performance, murder rate, among others. Based on the above universe of 
countries, this theory defends that, rather than aggregate income, an indicator that 
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cannot be correlated to these types of social problems, economic inequality has 
multidimensional negative impacts on the way these societies are structured.    
The view that inequality is not harmless and tends to have adverse effects on the 
community is now more widely accepted by academia and a number of international 
institutions. A good example of this is the fact that the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) has produced a human development index adjusted to countries' 
degree of economic inequality. The UNDP estimates that economic inequality in 
countries worldwide results in an average 23.3% reduction in their human 
development index (HDI). This figure was 33.5% in the countries with a low HDI in 
2012, 24.2% in those with a medium HDI, 20.6% in those with a high HDI and 10.8% in 
those with the highest HDI. In this last group, the United States is one of the countries 
that showed the greatest loss, dropping down 13 places in the HDI rankings (UNDP 
2013). 
If internal economic inequality has a negative effect on the functioning of societies and 
people's general living standards, it must be taken into account when measuring 
wellbeing and social development. These statistical correlations make even more 
sense when comprehensively backed up by reflection on the structural nature of 
inequality and an analysis of the social processes that cause it to multiply. Following 
Pierre Bourdieu's theoretic and conceptual heritage, Alain Bihr and Roland Pfefferkorn 
(2008) uphold that social inequalities tend to be passed down from one generation to 
the next, to interact with each other and accumulate. In other words, they are 
systemic. Inequality carries a social history as baggage and potentially extends to 
different spheres of life in society (Carmo 2010).  Inequality tends to condition social 
mobility processes and reduce the scope of opportunities within people's reach. The 
social inequality production and reproduction processes, whose intensity and sense 
also depend on the way institutions deal will them (e.g. school or public policies), have 
a potential effect on people's life conditions and available opportunities. From the 
point of view of social structuring processes, inequality has a potentially harmful effect 
on social mobility, development and use of skills and talents, tending to reproduce 
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phenomena like poverty and social exclusion. Inequality of economic, educational or 
relational resources influences inequality of opportunities (Dubet 2010).   
The systemic negative effects of inequality, especially from an economic viewpoint, 
can also be analysed from a perspective of collective action and the influence wielded 
by lobbies in institutions and public policies. This is one of the analytical lines followed 
by Joseph Stiglitz (2012). He upholds that the economic elite in the United States has 
been imposing its interests and world view on politics, thereby ensuring that public 
policies help to reproduce and intensify social inequality and perpetuate their 
dominant position in the social structure. Tax policies that favour the wealthy or 
channel revenue to them are examples of rich people's ideological, legal and 
institutional control of political decision making. Stiglitz believes that the takeover of 
political power by the country's economic elite has helped to reduce levels of trust and 
social cohesion, stiffen social structures (reducing equal opportunities) and weaken the 
tax revenue needed for public investment in education, infrastructure or technology. 
The most structural effect of inequality is, however, the creation of institutional, legal, 
political and cognitive conditions that guarantee its reproduction:  
“The more egalitarian societies work harder to preserve their social cohesion; in the 
more unequal societies, government policies and other institutions tend to foster the 
persistence of  inequality” (Idem: 77). 
Social and economic inequalities can be politically, legally and institutionally increased 
or reduced. In other words, the structuring of inequalities is not unequivocal, the way 
they evolve and interact does not follow a logic that is independent from the way 
society deals with them, especially the way public policies include and act on them. It 
is therefore necessary to bear in mind that the reproduction and accumulation of 
inequalities are not a teleological fatality, a self-explanatory, self-referential social 
dynamic but rather a possibility moulded by a number of other variables. In certain 
legal, political and institutional frameworks, inequality can therefore decrease and not 
be reproduced. Tax policies are a particularly effective tool in mitigating economic 
inequality in terms of market and disposable income (Alvaredo et al. 2013; Atkinson, 
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Piketty and Saez 2010), although the institutions that regulate the labour market and 
education resources are also relevant factors that help define how income is 
distributed (OECD 2011; Krugman 2007).      
As inequality is an important feature of any society and a factor that influences 
society's social, economic and political structuring processes, an analysis of inequalities 
in general and economic inequality in particular is a basic theoretic and methodological 
tool in a comparison between countries. In this case, we are comparing two societies 
with high degrees of economic inequality.  
It is important to include a brief methodological note before going on to the different 
issues. The facts and arguments in this study are essentially based on a secondary 
analysis of official statistical sources or data produced by researchers and international 
institutions. In some cases, the information is directly comparable as the data are 
harmonised, though this is not always so. In these cases, we provide the available 
information while referring to the methodological differences behind the production 
of the statistics in question.   
The impossibility of comparing data may simply be due to the fact that they do not 
exist in one of the countries or that the periods for which information exists do not 
exactly coincide. When this happens, we combine a comparison of the available 
information with a presentation of the data for only one of the countries. As a rule, 
however, we present statistics that can be compared.  
 
1. Two societies with a huge gap between richest and poorest  
The OECD has been warning of greater economic inequality in a number of its member 
countries in recent decades. It did so first in Growing Unequal? Income Distribution 
and Poverty in OECD Countries (OECD 2008) and has continued in more recent works, 
such as Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising (OECD 2011). In both studies, 
the United States and Portugal are among the OECD countries with the highest levels 
of economic inequality. The data in the more recent survey show the United States 
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and Portugal (plus Israel) at the top of the second group of countries with the greatest 
economic inequality, behind Chile, Mexico and Turkey. The degree of inequality in 
disposable income in these last three countries vastly exceeds that of the other 
members with Gini coefficients of 0.4 (or in Chile close to 0.5) 3.    
The data in Table 1 are an update of the information in the above-mentioned report 
and refer to disposable monetary income per equivalent adult, i.e. the economic 
resources of households after social transfers, taxes and social security contributions4. 
In 2010, the Gini coefficient was 0.380 in the United States and 0.344 in Portugal. 
These figures are the fourth and sixth highest in the OECD countries and are way above 
the average. An analysis of the extent of economic inequality in the two countries can 
be based on another two measures.  
The S80/S20 ratio is a measure of inequality that compares the ratio between total 
income received by the top and the bottom quintile. In the United States, the income 
of the 20% richest was 7.9 higher than the 20% poorest, while in Portugal the ratio was 
5.7.  
An analysis of economic inequality using ratios can also use smaller groups (quantiles) 
for comparing distribution of income, e.g. the richest 10% and the poorest 10% 
(S90/S10). Table 1 shows that the degree of economic inequality in the United States 
measured with this indicator is much higher than in Portugal. The income of the richest 
10% was 15.9 times greater than that of the poorest 10%, while in Portugal it was 9.3, 
similar to the average of the OECD countries (9.4). 
                                                          
3
 The Gini coefficient is a measure that synthesises the dispersion of a certain indicator in a single figure. 
When measuring income inequality, the coefficient is 0 if all individuals have the same income, or 100 or 
1 if all the income is concentrated in one person. It thus measures the dispersion of income based on a 
hypothetical reference scenario of perfect equality. It is more sensitive to incomes closer to mean 
incomes and less sensitive to the disparities between the two extremes. 
4
 In recent years, the OECD has been using a scale of equivalence that consists of adjusting each 
individual's income to the size of his or her household based on a scale of "equivalence elasticity" of 0.5. 
This means that the income of the people in the household is adjusted by the square root of the size of 
the household. For example, in a household of four people, each one's income would correspond to the 
division of the household's total income by two (the square root of four). This method does not, 
however, distinguish between adults and children and means that “a household’s economic needs 
increase less than proportionally with its size” (OECD, 2008: 41-42). 
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The figures for these three measures of inequality in the United States are higher than 
in Portugal. Although Portugal's inequality levels are higher than in most of the OECD 
countries in the Gini coefficient and S80/S20 ratio, its figure for the S90/S10 ratio is in 
line with the other OECD members. 
 
Table 1. Measures of inequality in disposable income in the OECD countries (2010) 
  Gini coefficient S80/S20 S90/S10 
Chile 0.508 13.8 30.0 
Mexico 0.466 12.7 28.5 
Turkey 0.411 8.4 15.1 
United States 0.380 7.9 15.9 
Israel  0.376 7.8 13.6 
Portugal 0.344 5.7 9.3 
United Kingdom 0.341 5.6 10.0 
Spain 0.338 6.6 13.1 
Greece 0.337 6.0 10.8 
Japan 0.336 6.2 10.7 
Australia 0.334 5.7 8.9 
Ireland 0.331 5.4 9.1 
Canada 0.320 5.3 8.9 
Estonia 0.319 5.3 8.8 
Italy 0.319 5.6 10.2 
New Zealand 0.317 5.1 8.0 
South Korea 0.310 5.7 10.5 
Poland 0.305 4.8 7.7 
France 0.303 4.5 7.2 
Switzerland 0.298 4.6 7.3 
Netherlands 0.288 4.3 6.9 
Germany 0.286 4.3 6.7 
Hungary 0.272 4.0 6.0 
Luxembourg 0.270 3.9 5.6 
Sweden 0.269 4.0 6.1 
Austria 0.267 3.9 5.9 
Belgium 0.262 3.9 5.6 
Slovakia 0.261 3.8 5.9 
Finland 0.260 3.7 5.4 
Czech Rep. 0.256 3.6 5.4 
Denmark 0.252 3.6 5.3 
Norway 0.249 3.7 6.0 
Slovenia 0.246 3.6 5.3 
Iceland 0.244 3.5 5.3 
OECD 34 0.313 - 9.4 
Source:  Statistics, List of key indicators (OECD) 
Note 1: Countries ranked in descending order of  Gini coefficient  
Note 2: The data on Chile, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and Turkey are for 
2009. 
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This information refers to the last year in which information was available for each 
country and enables us to conduct a synchronic analysis. It is also useful to include 
diachronic information, however. Figure 1 shows changes in economic inequality in the 
United States, Portugal and OECD between 1980 and 2010. While there is information 
available for almost all these years for the United States, this is not the case for 
Portugal or the average of the OECD countries. 
 
Source: Statistics, List of key indicators (OECD). 
 
The Gini coefficient for economic inequality in Portugal in 1980 was around 14% higher 
than in the United States: 0.350 against 0.307. Between 1980 and 1993, when the Gini 
coefficient was 0.369, economic inequality in the United States increased around 20%, 
and then went down slightly until 1999. It then increased irregularly and the figure in 
2010 (0.380) was around 24% superior higher than in 1980.  
Inequality in Portugal went down in the 1980s. There was a considerable rise in 
inequality in the first half of the 1990s followed by slight drop in the second half. In 
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spite of this change in direction, economic inequality was at a higher level at the end of 
the 1990s than at the beginning. According to Rodrigues (2007: 305):  
“The reduction in inequality in the 1980s is closely associated with a more accentuated growth in 
incomes at the lower end of the scale. The rise in inequality in the 1990s was mainly due to 
changes at the upper end of the scale, where we find the households that benefited most from 
the economic growth.”  
The first years of the new millennium witnessed an increase in economic inequality 
and the Gini coefficient was 0.385 in 2004, about 17% higher than in 1990 (0.329). 
From then until 2009 there was a progressive reduction in economic inequality in the 
country. Rodrigues, Figueiras and Junqueira (2012) attribute this in part to social 
policies aimed at assisting the more disadvantaged strata of the population, such as 
Social Insertion Income and Elderly People's Subsidy5. In 2009, the Gini coefficient was 
0.339, but increased to 0.344 in 2010. A comparison of the Gini coefficient in Portugal 
in 1980 and 2010 shows that it fell by around 1.7%.  
Figure 1 indicates several trends. Firstly it shows that the level of inequality in the two 
countries over the period in question was always higher than the OECD average. 
Secondly it demonstrates that inequality increased in Portugal in the 1990s and 2000s, 
while in the United States in fell slightly or stabilised, especially between 1994 and 
2000. Thirdly between 2004 and 2008/2009 there was a substantial reduction in 
economic inequality in Portugal, while the 2000s in the United States witnessed an 
increase. An increase in economic inequality in 2010 interrupted the downward trend 
in Portugal and there was also a rise in inequality in the United States compared to 
2008 (no information is available in the United States for 2009). We find that there was 
greater growth in economic inequality in the United States than in Portugal, being 
10.5% higher in the USA than in Portugal in 2010. 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Specific public policies aimed to provide income to the most fragile fringes of the Portuguese society, 
namely the ones with very low or no income at all and the elderly populations that earn survival 
pensions. 
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2. Income inequality and monetary redistribution 
The previous section provided information on inequality in disposable income, i.e. the 
household's income after taxes, social security contributions and social transfers. It is 
analytically enlightening to determine the level of economic inequality before the 
state's redistribution and to measure the role played by the state in mitigating market 
inequality (economic resources before redistribution by the state). 
This can be done by comparing the Gini coefficient for economic inequality with 
market income and disposable income.  In 2010, Portugal was the seventh highest 
OECD country (plus Russia) in terms of market income inequality for the population 
aged between 18 and 65, behind the United States. An analysis of inequality of 
disposable income shows that Portugal was still the seventh most unequal country of 
this universe of countries, while the United States was the third, after Chile and Russia. 
The fact that the United States rose in the economic inequality rankings and Portugal's 
position remained the same when we move from market income to disposable income 
shows that the impact of state redistribution is higher in Portugal than in the United 
States. Figure 2 shows the decrease in the Gini coefficient resulting from the effect of 
taxes and social security and also social transfers from the state to households in the 
OECD countries and Russia. State redistribution in Slovenia, Ireland, Belgium, Finland, 
Denmark, Austria and Luxembourg results in a reduction of over 35% in economic 
inequality. In the Czech Republic, Norway, France, Slovakia and Sweden the impact 
varies between 35% and 30%. State redistribution in Portugal reduced economic 
inequality by around 26.6%, which was considerably more than in the United States, 
where it was 19.9%.  
Unlike South Korea or Canada, where the effect of state redistribution is fairly limited 
but inequality levels are relatively low, the United States (along with Chile, Israel and 
Russia) had both high economic inequality and low levels of monetary redistribution. 
The average impact of state redistribution was around 25% in the OECD countries 
(OECD 2012).  
13 
 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Statistics database, List of key indicators (OECD) 
Note 1: There are no available Gini coefficient data on market income for Hungary, Mexico or Turkey and so these countries have not been 
included in Figure 2. The data for Ireland, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland are from 2009. 
Note 2: We have used the same method as the OECD for measuring the impact of redistribution policies (OECD, 2011: 268-270).  
 
According to Joumard, Pisou and Bloch (2012), there is a positive relationship between 
market economic inequality in the OECD countries and the impact of redistribution 
policies (social transfers and taxes) for the total population. This relationship is not 
linear, however. Indeed, most of the countries whose redistribution policies reduce 
economic inequality more have comparatively low market income inequality. This is 
the case in the northern European countries, the Czech Republic and Belgium.  
This conclusion is confirmed when we look at the impacts of state redistribution in 
countries with high economic inequality. Redistribution policies in Portugal and the 
United States reduce economic inequality by less than 10 percentage points (pp) – 
below the OECD average – and in Chile by less than 5 pp.  
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Figure 2. Reduction in economic inequality associated with redistributive policies, pop. 
aged 18-65, OECD countries and Russia (2010) (%)  
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When analysing the effects of state redistribution we must distinguish between those 
of monetary transfers and of taxes. 
Monetary transfers to households account for around three quarters of the reduction 
in economic inequality in the OECD countries (OECD 2012). According to Joumard, 
Pisou and Bloch (2012), these payments had reduced economic inequality in these 
countries by around 19% by 2010 and there was “no clear link between the degree of 
market income inequality and the redistributive impact of transfers” (Idem: 10). In 
countries like the Czech Republic, Finland, Sweden and Denmark monetary transfers 
have high impacts on reducing inequality, while Portugal and the United States are in 
the group with the lowest impacts in this regard: a 4.3 pp reduction in Portugal and 4.1 
pp in the United States against an OECD average of 7.9 pp.6  
Portugal and the United States are similar in terms of the low impact of monetary 
transfers on reducing market economic inequality, although the reasons for the small 
size of the impact are different. According to these authors, in the United States it is 
due to the small amount of monetary transfers compared to the OECD average, while 
in Portugal it is because of these transfers’  “lower progressivity” (Idem: 11). Alves 
(2012) agrees that the impact of monetary transfers in Portugal is low. Nevertheless, 
he states that this fact is explained by the small volume of social transfers to the 
bottom groups, not because of the way it is channelled. According to him, Portugal is 
one of the European Union members whose social transfers are more progressive. 7  
On the subject of the effects of taxes and social security contributions in reducing 
economic inequality, Joumard, Pisou and Bloch (2012) conclude that there are no 
significant differences among the OECD countries8. Even so, the United States, along 
with Australia, Denmark, Germany, Israel and Italy, is in the group of countries in which 
the difference between inequality levels before and after income tax was the greatest. 
                                                          
6
 Carlos Farinha Rodrigues (Coord.), Rita Figueiras and Vítor Junqueira (2012) reached similar 
conclusions about Portugal. They state that in 2009 Portugal had one of the lowest efficacy and 
efficiency rate associated with social contributions in a universe of 15 EU-27 countries (Idem: 177).  
7
 Alves (2012) doesn’t include the old age pensions in the redistributive process, whereas Joumard, 
Pisou and Bloch (2012) do. This may indicate that old age pension have a low redistributive impact.  
8
 The impact of taxes on reducing income inequality depends on the size and progression of the tax 
burden.   
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In other words, they are the OECD countries where taxes have the highest impact on 
reducing economic inequality. The United States is the only OECD country where taxes 
actually have a similar impact on reducing economic inequality to that of monetary 
transfers to households (Idem; Förster and Whiteford 2009). The mitigating effect of 
taxes on economic inequality in Portugal is also higher than the OECD average 
(Joumard, Pisou and Bloch 2012). 
The relatively high impact of taxes on reducing economic inequality in the United 
States shown in this study is quite surprising, considering that the country's tax policy 
has been held as one of the main causes of income being concentrated at the top and 
of economic inequality in general (Stiglitz 2012; Krugman 2007). Piketty and Saez 
(2006) used government data to analyse the progressivity of the tax system in the 
United States on the basis of its impacts on concentration of income in the top groups. 
They conclude that there has been a reduction in tax progressivity in the United States 
in recent decades and this has favoured an increase in income concentrated in the top 
percentile and fractiles. On the one hand, “federal tax system reduced income 
concentration the most in the 1960s and 1970s when income concentration was 
relatively low”; on the other hand, “the federal tax system has a relatively modest 
effect on the top 0.1 percent income share in recent years when income inequality has 
become higher” (Idem: 14-15). According to the authors, the reduction in the 
progressivity of the United States tax system was due to a reduction in marginal rates 
on top incomes, the system of exemptions and tax benefits and taxation of capital 
income at lower marginal rates. 
As a complement to these approaches, we show the highest bracket's personal income 
tax rates in the OECD countries in 2012. The amount to which these rates apply varies 
substantially from one country to another and the rate actually charged may vary on 
the basis of exemptions, tax benefits and the taxable income structure for each 
individual or tax unit.  
In 2012, Denmark was the OECD country in which the tax rate on the top income 
bracket was the highest at 60.2%. This rate was 50% or more in eight countries. As in 
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Finland and Greece, the highest gross income bracket in Portugal was taxed at 49%9. 
The rate in the United States was 41.9%. Amongst the countries analysed in Table 2, 10 
had top rates of 40% or less. The Czech Republic (15%), Hungary (16%), Slovakia (19%) 
and Estonia (21%) had the lowest rates. 
Table 2. Top statutory personal income tax rates  in the 
OECD countries (2012) 
Denmark 60.2% 
Sweden 56.6% 
Belgium 53.7% 
Netherlands 52.0% 
Spain 52.0% 
France 50.7% 
Japan 50.0% 
Austria 50.0% 
United Kingdom 50.0% 
Finland 49.0% 
Greece 49.0% 
Portugal 49.0% 
Italy 48.6% 
Ireland 48.0% 
Israel 48.0% 
Canada 48.0% 
Australia 47.5% 
Germany 47.5% 
Iceland 46.2% 
United States 41.9% 
South Korea 41.8% 
Switzerland 41.7% 
Luxembourg 41.3% 
Slovenia 41.0% 
Norway 40.0% 
Chile 40.0% 
Turkey 35.7% 
New Zealand 33.0% 
Poland 32.0% 
Mexico 30.0% 
Estonia 21.0% 
Slovakia 19.0% 
Hungary 16.0% 
Czech Rep. 15.0% 
Source: OECD Tax Database (OECD). 
 
                                                          
9
 In Portugal a rate of 46.5% was charged on gross income over 153,330 euros a year in 2012, plus an 
additional charge of 2.5%. Income in the top bracket (over 80,000 euros) was taxed at 48% in 2013. A 
surtax of 3.5% was charged on all taxpayers plus an additional solidarity charge of 2.5% on taxable 
income between 80,000 and 250,000 euros. All income over 250,000 euros was subject to an additional 
5% solidarity charge. 
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Our analysis of the impacts of taxes and social transfers on reducing economic 
inequality is based on different methodological strategies, conceptual definitions and 
information sources that influence the conclusions reached. It is therefore necessary 
to regard this type of information with caution and compare the different 
methodological approaches and analytical perspectives available in the literature. 
Instruments such as the Inquérito às Condições de Vida e Rendimento (Survey on 
Income and Living Conditions) in Portugal and the Current Population Survey in the 
United States gather empirical information for an analysis of the main trends in income 
distribution. From a methodological point of view, however, they are not the most 
reliable or appropriate instruments for measuring and analysing the groups at the top 
of the top income bracket. Phenomena such as sample underrepresentation of these 
groups, their propensity for under-declaring income or refusal to participate in surveys 
explain this limitation. Tax data have therefore been used to analyse the top incomes. 
It is this kind of information that we will use in the next section to compare the top 
incomes in Portugal and the United States. 
 
3. Greater concentration of income at the top 
Since Thomas Piketty published his seminal work Les Hauts Revenus en France au 
20ème Siècle – Inegalités et Redistributions (2001), a number of researchers have been 
producing studies on top incomes based on government tax data for many countries. 
These data are estimates based on tax sources and complement and can be compared 
to statistical information from public surveys. The same strategy will be followed 
below.  
Table 3 shows a close-up of levels of concentration of pre-tax income of several groups 
in the top income brackets in Portugal and the United States (excluding capital gains10). 
                                                          
10
 As in Alvaredo et al. (2013), OECD (2011), Alvaredo (2010) and Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2010), we 
have not used data on top incomes including capital gains in the United States in our direct comparison 
between the two countries. One of the reasons is that there is no information on the distribution of 
capital gains declared for Portugal (Alvaredo, 2010: 564-565). 
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The latest available data for Portugal refer to 2005. As preliminary information for 
2011 is available for the United States, we will present its data from 2005 and 2011. 
The degree of concentration of income in the top quantiles is significantly more 
pronounced in the United States than in Portugal in all the groups analysed. While in 
2005 the richest 10% in Portugal had 38.3% of the total income, in the United States 
they had 44.9%, a concentration level 17.5% higher than Portugal. The more we 
narrow the range of income groups, the greater the difference is between the levels of 
concentration in the two countries. The richest 1% in the United States accounted for 
17.7% of the country's total income while in Portugal they accounted for 9.8% (81% 
difference). The difference in level of concentration between the two countries grows 
if we compared fractions of the richest 1% group. While in Portugal the richest 0.01% 
accounted for around 0.7% of total income, they accounted for 3.3% in the United 
States (a difference of around 377%).  
Table 3. Income share held by the top quantiles, USA and Portugal (%) 
 
United States Portugal Difference % between USA 
and PT in 2005 2005 2011 2005 
10% richest  44.94 46.54 38.25 17.5 
5% richest 33.12 33.91 26.01 27.3 
1% richest 17.68 17.43 9.77 81.0 
0.5% richest 13.72 13.34 6.42 113.7 
0.1% richest 7.76 7.36 2.48 212.9 
0.01% richest 3.29 3.29 0.69 376.8 
Source: Alvaredo, Facundo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, The World Top 
Incomes Database, http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu 
Note: Pre-tax figures 
 
One of the advantages of tax data is the possibility of using them to build wide-ranging 
historical series. We now look at statistical information on the evolution of income 
concentration levels in the top groups.  
Figure 3 shows the share of total income of the richest 1% and 0.1% in Portugal and 
the United States. The data for the United States refer to 1913-2011, while those for 
the richest 1% and 0.1% in Portugal refer to 1976-2005 and 1936-2005, respectively.  
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Between 1913 and the Wall Street Crash in 1929 there was not only a high level of 
income concentration in these groups but it was also tending to grow. This timeframe 
was part of the so-called Gilded Age, which began in the late 19th century and 
witnessed the emergence of great fortunes, low taxation on income and wealth and 
deregulation of the financial markets (Krugman 2007). From 1929 onwards, the 
economic and financial shock caused by the Great Depression and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's New Deal, income concentration began a downward trend in the top 
groups. This trend lasted until the United States entered the Second World War, when 
there was a highly pronounced reduction in concentration of income in the richest 
groups of the population. Over the next 30 years, the share of income held by the 
richest remained relatively low. This was the result of the structuring effect of the 
measures taken to sustain the war economy between 1941 and 1945 (e.g. control and 
levelling of salaries), a progressive tax policy and the bargaining power of the trade 
unions. The late 1970s and 1980s marked the beginning of an ongoing increase in the 
concentration of income in the top groups. According to several authors, this was 
associated with Ronald Reagan's policy of deregulating the financial sector, which 
helped a restricted number of professional groups directly or indirectly linked to 
financial services to increase their wealth (Stiglitz 2012; Horn et al 2009; Krugman 
2007).This increase in concentration of income in the top tail of the distribution was 
accompanied by a rise in the preponderance of wage income in the economic 
resources of these groups (Piketty 2013; Piketty and Saez 2003). 
The available data allows us to analyse the performance of top incomes in the United 
States during the current financial crisis. According to Emmanuel Saez (2013a), 
between 2007 and 2009, the real average income of the richest 1% fell by 36.3%, 
which was higher than the country's average reduction (17.4%). This represents a 
23.5% decrease to 18.1% of their share of total income. This fall was largely due to loss 
of capital income, which fell from 895 billion dollars in 2007 to 236 billion in 2009. If 
we consider capital income, the share of income held by the richest 10% went down 
from 49.7% to 46.5%. However, if we exclude capital income from the analysis, there is 
hardly any change, as it went from 45.7% to 45.5%. In aggregate terms, 49% of total 
20 
 
income losses in the period were borne by the richest 1% (Idem). This trend began to 
turn around in 2009, however. The real average income of the richest 1% increased 
11.7% between 2009 and 2011, while for the remaining population it fell 0.4%.  
According to the author's preliminary data (Saez 2013b), this trend grows stronger if 
we take 2012 into account. The income of the richest 1% increased 19.6% from 2011 
to 2012, while that of the rest of the population rose only 1%. He states that the 
income of the richest 1% grew 31.4% between 2009 and 2012, while that of the 
remaining 99% increased only 0.4%. This means that 95% of the gains in income in the 
first three years of recovery went to the richest.  
Where Portugal is concerned, Figure 3 shows that levels of income concentration in 
the 1930s and 1940s were much higher than in 2005. In 1936 the richest 0.1% were 
estimated to receive 5.2% of the population's total income. Although Portugal did not 
take part in the Second World War, these figures went down during the period. The 
share of total income in the hands of the richest 0.1% fell from 5.2% in 1941 to 3.1% in 
1946. During this period, the marginal rates on the highest incomes went from 8.5% to 
30% (Alvaredo 2010)11. Between 1950 and 1970, there was a slight drop in the level of 
income concentration in this group, and this trend accelerated after that (also for the 
richest 1%) until a break in the series in 1982.  
Since the series restarted in 1989 concentration of income has increased progressively 
in the two quantiles analysed in Figure 3. The marginal rates on the highest incomes 
did not undergo any significant changes in the period, which indicates that the taxation 
framework was not a decisive factor in the increase of top incomes (Idem: 13). A study 
by Rodrigues, Figueiras and Junqueira (2012) makes an initial approach to this 
phenomenon. According to these authors, inequality in the distribution of income 
from paid work grew deeper between 1985 and 2009 and the concentration of this 
income in the top quantiles increased sharply by 50.7% in the richest 1%, 60.9% in the 
richest 0.1% and 126.7% in the richest 0.01%. In other words, the employment market 
                                                          
11
 Between 1939 and 1941, this inequality measure rose from 4.6% to the 5.2% mentioned.  
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was a source of inequality and concentration of economic resources in very small 
groups of the population with relatively well-defined occupations (Cantante 2013). 
 
 
Source: Alvaredo, Facundo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, The World Top Incomes Database, 
http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu 
Note: Pre-tax figures 
 
After showing the data on concentration of income at the top in the two countries, we 
now conduct a brief comparative analysis of these trends.  
A comparison between the group of the richest 1% in Portugal and the United States is 
only possible after 1976. In that year, income concentration for these groups in the 
United States and Portugal was similar: about 7.9% in both countries. In 1989, these 
groups' share of the income had fallen slightly (6.8%) in Portugal while in the United 
States it has risen quite significantly to 12.6%. From 1989 to 2005, the variation rate of 
these indicators increased a bit more in Portugal than in the United States: 42.8% and 
40.2%. Although this rise was slightly more accentuated in Portugal than in the United 
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Figure 3. Income share of the richest  1% and 0.1% in the USA and Portugal (1913-2011) 
USA richest 1% USA  richest 0.1% Portugal richest 1% Portugal richest 0.1%
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States, the extent of the concentration of income in the top 1% in 2005 was much 
greater in the United States than in Portugal: 17.7% to 9.8%.  
Regarding the concentration of income in the 0.1% group, we find that breadth of this 
phenomenon was greater in Portugal than in the United States from the mid-1940s to 
early 1970s. Indeed, this occurs not only in comparison with the United States, but 
with countries like Spain, France or the United Kingdom (Alvaredo 2010). From 1980 
onward, there was a much sharper increase in this indicator in the United States than 
in Portugal (which was not the case for the richest 1%). It was in this period that the 
United States stood out as the most unequal in terms of distribution of income (and 
wealth) in the most developed countries in the world and the fourth highest in the 
OECD countries, behind Chile, Mexico and Turkey. As mentioned above, the data 
shown here for the United States do not include capital gains. If we take this income 
component into account, the level of concentration of income in the top groups 
increases substantially. For example, in 2011 the richest 1% had around 20% of the 
total income in the United States and between 1980 and 2007 their share of the 
income grew by around 135% (Alvaredo et al. 2013).   
 
Conclusion 
Portugal and the United States are two countries in which income distribution is quite 
unequal. This gap is more pronounced in the USA than in Portugal, but if we place 
them in the universe of OECD countries we find that their profiles are relatively similar. 
Economic inequality is a structural phenomenon that has important, multidimensional 
impacts on the way societies work. Although economic inequality may be reproduced 
or intensified by social, economic, institutional and political dynamics, this trend is not 
inevitable, however. A diachronic analysis of economic inequality in the two countries 
shows just that, as the extent of this phenomenon varies considerably over the years. 
Consider, for example, the increase in inequality in the United States prior to the 1929 
crisis or in the late 1970s and early 1980s, two periods that witnessed tax reductions 
and deregulation of the financial markets. On the other hand, we can see the 
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equalisation of income distribution for several decades under the New Deal and later 
in the war economy in the United States or on a smaller scale that in Portugal between 
2004 and 2009.  
The increase of top income concentration is one of the most notable phenomena 
resulting from the analysis of income distribution. The increase of income inequality in 
most of the OECD countries in the last decade can be explained in part by this 
dynamic. Both in Portugal and the United States market income held by these groups 
has increased significantly in recent decades. The data presented in this article shows 
that top income concentration has been more intense in the United States than in 
Portugal. If we look at the very top income groups (1% fractiles), we conclude they 
have been pushing up overall inequality in a more deep way in the United States than 
in Portugal.   
As in most advanced countries, top income concentration has put pressure on the 
state's ability to reduce inequality of disposable income. Although the phenomenon of 
economic inequality may be associated with issues as diverse as labour and trade 
union rights or access to education, this study essentially addresses redistribution 
policies in Portugal and the United States on the basis of social payments and taxation. 
Our conclusion is that, in general terms, Portugal has higher economic redistribution 
levels than the United States, although both countries average below European and 
OECD countries. While the data from population surveys in the United States shows 
that the state's redistribution has not managed to reduce inequality in disposable 
income in the last decade, Portugal experienced a progressive reduction in economic 
inequality in the second half of the 2000s. This trend was mainly due to policies on the 
transfer of income to more disadvantaged households, such as the Social Insertion 
Income and Elderly People's Subsidy.  
The redistributive role of taxes and social transfers in the two countries is quite 
different. While in Portugal the reduction in economic inequality is essentially due to 
social transfers, in the United States taxes and monetary transfers to households have 
equivalent weights in the redistribution process. Nonetheless, analyses by authors 
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such as Joseph E. Stiglitz, Paul Krugman, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez have 
been demonstrating that the US tax policy has resulted in recent decades in a 
considerable increase in concentration of income at the very top of the distribution. As 
we show in this article, top income tax rate is considerably lower in the United Sates 
than in most European countries, including Portugal. Nevertheless, both in Portugal 
and the United States, but also in most OECD countries, there is a big difference 
between top rates regarding income as an all and capital income taxes (Piketty 2013). 
Capital income earners, who are typically the richest among rich, benefit from tax 
systems that tend to be harsher regarding labour revenue and benefit wealth and 
wealth income. This fact isn’t easy to capture using the available data. But it forms a 
legal frame that boosts income inequality and reinforces income and wealth 
concentration at the very top.      
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